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Since  1972,  food  prices  have  risen more  than the overall  rate of
inflation.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  preceding  decade  when  food
prices  generally  lagged  behind  increases  in  the  prices  of  non-food
items and  services.  The question which  this paper  seeks to answer is
what  can  be  done  specifically  to  hold  down  or reduce  the cost of
food over and  above  general policies designed to bring down the rate
of inflation.  Among  the things which  the government might do is to
alter support  programs  for farm  products  or to authorize  additional
imports of commodities  like beef.
In assessing  the potential role of changes in farm and food policies
on retail food  costs,  one  must keep  in mind that such policies affect
only raw  product  costs. These  costs  now account  for only about 30
cents  out of each dollar the typical consumer  spends for food. Thus
the  potential  for  reducing  food  price  inflation by eliminating  farm
price-support programs is quite limited.
Relative Changes in Food and Nonfood Prices  Since  1972
Annual  rates of change  in food prices  since  the period  of acceler-
ated  inflation  began  in  1972  have  been  more  uneven  from year to
year  than  the  prices  of  nonfood  items  and  services.  Year  to  year
increases  in  food  prices  over  the  past  8  years  have  ranged  from  a
low of 3.1  percent in  1976 to  a high of 14.5 percent in 1973 (Table
1).  Processing  and  distribution  costs  of  food,  which  now  account
for  two-thirds  of  total  food  expenditures  (including  the  cost  of
food consumed  away  from home)  have followed  the general  rate  of
inflation,  but not raw product costs. The latter have been influenced
by  a  somewhat  unique  set of forces  as well  as by general inflation.
Grain  prices,  for example,  shot upward  in 1972-73  in response to
very  large  purchases  by  the  Soviet  Union.  They  remained  high  in
1974 following  a short crop  in the U.S.  and  poor harvests in several
of  the  developing  countries.  This,  in  turn,  had  a  profound  effect
on  subsequent  production  of fed  beef,  pork and poultry  products.
Coffee  and  sugar  prices,  likewise,  responded  to  external  events.
Excessive rain  at some  periods, untimely  frosts, and too little rain in
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1972-79
Year  Food  All Items Less Food*
(per cent)
1972  4.3  3.0
1973  14.5  3.9
1974  14.4  9.9
1975  8.5  9.3
1976  3.1  6.6
1977  6.3  6.5
1978  10.0  7.2
1979#  10.2  11.1
*Based  on the percent change  from the average  index for the preceding  year.
#Estimated  change, based on data available  through July 1979.
California  also  contributed  to  temporary  shortages  of  citrus  fruit
and  vegetables.  Meat  prices  have  been  influenced,  not  only  by the
cost  and  availability  of  grain,  but  also  by the internal  dynamics  of
the cattle  cycle.  Consequently,  food  prices  have  sometimes  behaved
quite differently from nonfood prices.
Much  of the year to year variation  in the rate of inflation in food
costs  since  1972 has been  associated  with changes  in the supply-de-
mand  relationships  for a relatively small but economically  important
group  of commodities  including  beef,  pork,  citrus fruit, winter vege-
tables,  coffee,  fish,  and  sugar.  These  commodities  now account for
around  60  percent  of  retail  food  expenditures.  Thus,  if  we  are  to
curb  inflation  in  raw product  costs,  special  attention  must be  given
to the prices of these items.
Raw Product Costs
The  limited  role  which  farm  and food policies can play in holding
down  retail  food  costs  is highlighted  in Table  2.  The farm  value  of
food  purchased  for  consumption  at  home  now  amounts  to  only
about  26  cents  out  of  each  dollar  the  consumer  spends  for  food.
One  must  add  to  this the  farm  value  of  food  consumed  in restau-
rants  and  fast  food  outlets,  or distributed  through  public  and  pri-
vate  institutional feeding  programs.  In total,  the farm  value  of food
ingredients  amounts  to  only about 30 percent of aggregate consumer
expenditures  for food.  Imported items account for around  5  percent
of the total and marketing costs the rest.
Simple  arithmetic  makes  clear  that  one  cannot  have  a  major
impact on the overall  rate of inflation  or even on retail food costs if
action  is  limited  to policies  which  influence raw  product  costs.  The
cost  of  labor  involved  in  processing,  transporting,  and  distributing
food  plus  the  cost  of packaging  now equals  the farm value  of food
purchased  for  home  consumption.  Assume  the raw product  cost of
all  food  purchased  (including  that  consumed  away  from  home)
66Table 2.  Where the Consumer's Food Dollar Goes
Estimated Cost Per
Type of Food Purchased  and Cost of Services  Dollar of Food Expenditure*
Food Purchased  for Home Consumption
Domestically  produced food
Farm value - raw  product cost  $.26
Labor employed  in distribution  .21
Packaging  .05
Transportation  .03
Other distribution costs#  .14
.69
Imported Food  (mainly beverages,
bananas and fish)  .05
Food Purchased  for Consumption Away From
Home  .26
$1.00
*Based on data for 1978 and estimates for 1979.
#Includes taxes,  depreciation  on  buildings and  equipment,  or rental costs, utili-
ties, advertising,  and profits.
amounts  to 30  cents for each dollar spent for food. A ten percent re-
duction  in raw  product cost would amount to a reduction  of 3 cents
for  each  dollar  spent  for  food  which  is  equivalent  to  a  3  percent
reduction  in  the  food  component  of  the  Consumer  Price  Index.
Since  the weight of food in the Consumer Price Index is less than 20
percent,  this  means  that  reducing  farm  prices  by 10  percent  would
reduce the overall rate of inflation by less than  1 percent.
Effects  of Changes in Farm Price Programs on Consumer  Food Costs
The  U.S. has a selective price-support program which means that it
has  legislative  authority to raise  or maintain the  prices  of some but
not all  farm products. No support programs exist at present for poul-
try,  eggs,  pork,  beef,  fruits,  and  vegetables.  Except  for beef,  sugar
and  dairy  products,  import  policies  have relatively  little  influence
on  domestic  prices.  Most  countries  in  Europe  and  Japan  exercise
much  more  influence  over  imports  and  generally  maintain  farm
prices at a much higher level than in the United States.
The  principal  farm  policies  now in effect which influence the cost
and availability of raw food products are as follows:
(1)  Support prices and storage programs for grains
(2)  Import restrictions on beef
(3)  Support prices for milk and dairy products
(4)  Marketing  order regulations  for milk and a limited number
of fruit, vegetable and specialty crops
(5)  Support policies for sugar.
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son  it is important to identify the price-enhancing  effect of our exist-
ing  farm  and  food  policies  and  how  much  food  costs  might be re-
duced  if any one  or a combination of these policies were to be elimi-
nated or substantially altered.
The  combined  effects  of  the  principal  programs  which  serve  to
support  or raise  farm  prices  or raw product costs are  shown in Table
3.  The  way in  which these  estimates were derived is explained in the
following  section.  There is  room for argument  regarding  each of the
figures, but even  if one  allows  for a substantial  margin  of error,  the
general  order  of magnitude  of potential  savings  clearly  is  relatively
small.  Eliminating  all  programs  which  now  serve  to  enhance  farm
prices probably would result  in savings to consumers of no more than
$30  to  $35  per  person  per  year,  which  is  equivalent  to  around  3
percent  of  current  per  capita  food  expenditures.  These  are  strictly
short-run  effects.  The  longer-run  consequences,  taking  account  of
the  effect  of  lower  farm  prices  on  supply,  probably  would  be  even
less.
Table  3.  Estimated  Effects  of  Farm  Price-Support  and  Related  Programs  on
Average Per Capita  Food Costs,  1978-79
Effect  on
Per  Estimated  Annual Aver.
Capita  Price  Per Capita
Policy or Program  Use  Enhancement#  Expenditures
lbs/person  $/lb.  $/person
Price  Supports for Grain
Direct Consumption  140  .01  1.40
Indirect  (livestock  feed)  1380  .01  13.80
Import Restrictions  on Beef  120  .05  6.00
Support Prices for Milk  540  .005  2.70
Marketing  Orders
Class I Differential-fluid  milk  240  .01  2.40
Winter Vegetables  10  .05  .50
Sugar Support Program  124*  .05  6.20
Total  33.00
*All sweeteners.
#These  are the approximate  short-run effects; longer-run  effects would probably
be less because of the influence of lower prices on supply.
Support Programs for Grains
The  principal  effect  of  government  supply  management,  price-
support  and reserve  policies  for grains since 1972 has been to reduce
fluctuations  in  grain  prices  rather  than  to  raise  them  substantially.
During  the  past  eight  years,  grain  prices  have  fluctuated  over  a
much  wider  range  than  they did  in the 1960s,  but the amplitude of
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of government intervention.
Price-support  programs  for  grains  have  helped  to maintain  pro-
duction  which  in the long run benefits  consumers  and  enables us to
earn  additional  foreign  exchange.  The  short-run  price-enhancing
effect  of  our  grain  supply-management  program  has  been  modest.
Gains  probably  amount to no more  than  20  percent, or a maximum
of  50  to 60  cents  per bushel  for wheat and  corn.  This  is equivalent
to one cent per pound of raw product. Since per capita consumption
of cereal  products  now amounts  to only about 140 pounds per year,
the  direct  cost to consumers  of raising grain  prices  by one  cent per
pound is $1.40 per person per year.
The  indirect  effect  of  raising  grain  prices  on  the availability  and
cost  of  livestock  products  is  much  more  important  than the direct
effect  on  the  cost  of  bread,  cereals  and  snack  foods.  We  consume
indirectly  in the form  of livestock  products nearly 10 times as much
grain  as  we  consume  directly.  This year,  we will feed about 138 mil-
lion  metric  tons  of  grain  to  livestock  which  is equivalent  to nearly
1400  pounds  of  grain  per  person.  Thus  the indirect  cost of raising
grain  prices by the equivalent of one cent per pound is to add around
$14 per  person per year to the cost of livestock  feed ingredients.  In
the  short-run, these  costs  may not be  fully  passed  on to consumers,
but  in the  longer-run,  they  will  damp  down  incentives  to  increase
output  and  hence  will  lead  to  smaller  supplies  and  hence  higher
prices for livestock  products.
One  of  the  policy  instruments  frequently  overlooked that could
be exercised in such a way as to hold down current grain prices in the
United  States  is the authority  to limit exports to the  Soviet  Union.
Under  terms  of  a  bilateral  agreement  negotiated  with  the  Soviet
Union  in  1975,  they  must  now  obtain  our  permission  to purchase
more  than  8  million  tons  of  grain  in  any  given  year.  The  U.S.  has
granted  Russia  the  option  of  purchasing  additional  grain  in  each
of the past two  years;  during the current marketing year, because of
their  short  crop,we  may  permit  them  to  purchase  as  much  as  22
million  tons  of  grain.  Domestic  grain  prices  undoubtedly  would
have  been  somewhat  lower  in  1978  and  again  this  year  if  we  had
refused to grant this option.
If  we  had  not  permitted  the  additional  sales,  however,  govern-
ment  expenditures  for  price-support  payments  would  have  been
higher,  and  export  earnings  would  have  been  reduced.  Thus,  there
have  been  compelling reasons  for authorizing  additional  sales  to the
USSR  although such action probably has contributed  modestly to in-
flation  at  home.  My  guess  is that the impact of additional  sales  has
been  to  raise  grain  prices  by about  the same  order of magnitude  as
supply  management  programs,  that  is  50 to  60  cents  per bushel  or
around one cent per pound of grain.
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Voluntary  agreements  with the major beef export countries,  made
effective  by  the threat to impose  quotas,  have  held  beef imports in
recent  years  to the equivalent  of about 7 percent of total supplies of
beef.  The  amount  by  which  imports  might  rise  in  the  absence  of
quotas  is  frequently  exaggerated.  We would not be flooded with beef
simply  because  there  are  no large  uncommitted  supplies  in the prin-
cipal exporting countries.
An  analysis  of beef supplies  made  by Jackson  in the early  1970s
indicated  that  in  the  absence  of  trade  restrictions,  beef  imports
would  rise  by  an  amount  equivalent  to less  than  3  percent  of total
U.S.  production.  Since  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  for  beef  at
retail  appears  to  lie  somewhere  between  -. 6  and  -1.0,  an  unre-
stricted  import policy  would  depress the retail price of beef no more
than  3  to  5  percent,  and  perhaps  even  less  in the longer  run since
larger  imports  would  have  some  adverse  effects  on  incentives  to
maintain  domestic  production.  The  price  of hamburger  would  be
depressed  more  than the price  of choice  cuts,  but the  overall effect
would  be  to  produce  savings  to  consumers  of  not  more  than  five
cents per pound or $5  to $6 per person per year.
Support Prices for Milk
Prices paid to farmers for manufacturing milk have been supported
at around 80 percent of parity since 1973. Price-support  purchases  in
recent  years  have  averaged  less  than  3  percent  of production,  and  a
high  proportion  of the dairy  products purchased  were  subsequently
resold,  thus indicating  that this level  of support has not raised prices
substantially  above  where  they  would  have  been  in the absence  of
government  intervention.  At most,  farm  prices  have  been  raised  4
to  5  percent  above  the  market-clearing  level  which  is equivalent  to
about one half cent per pound of milk.
Since  per capita use  of milk  in  all  forms  now  amounts  to around
540 pounds per year, the annual net gain to consumers of eliminating
supports  on  dairy  products  would  not  exceed  $2.70  per  person.
Eliminating  import  restrictions  on  cheese  and  other dairy  products
might  have  a somewhat  larger  short-term  effect.  However,  the long-
term consequences  would  be modest  because  of the impact of lower
prices on domestic production.
Marketing Orders
Marketing  orders  have  come  under  attack  recently  both  from
within  the  federal  bureaucracy  (the  FTC  and  the  Justice  Depart-
ment)  and  by  consumer  organizations.  Much  of  the  criticism  has
been  directed  against  milk  marketing  orders;  however,  marketing
orders  for  fruits  and  vegetables  also  have  been  condemned  by
Houthakker and others.
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the major  targets  of criticism  of those who oppose marketing orders
for  milk.  Both  Class  I  differentials  and  super-pool  premiums  have
become  less  significant in recent years because of the strong demand
for cheese and  hence higher prices for manufacturing  milk. The price
which  handlers  are  compelled  to pay  for fluid  milk now averages  a
little  over  $2  per hundredweight  or two  cents  per pound  above  the
manufacturing  price.  Some  premium is required  to cover the added
costs  of  producing  milk  which  meets fluid health  standards,  but in
the  absence  of orders  the premium  would fall.  If all milk were  sold
at  the  manufacturing  price  and  supplies  were  to  be  maintained  at
their current level, the manufacturing  price would have to rise so that
returns would  equal  the current  blend  or average  price in federal  or-
der  markets.  The  net  effect  would  be  to reduce  the fluid price  by
about  $1  per hundredweight  or one  cent per pound. On a per capita
basis,  the  potential  saving  amounts  to  $2.40  per year (240  pounds
of fluid consumption  per capita x 10 per pound).
Marketing  orders  for  fruits  and  vegetables  have  had even  less  in-
fluence  on prices  than milk marketing orders. One of the reasons for
this  is that such orders apply only to a limited number of fresh fruits
and  vegetables.  Federal marketing orders cannot be used to influence
the production  or prices of fruits and vegetables sold for processing.
Furthermore,  the  majority  of  fruit  and  vegetable  orders  have  been
adopted  mainly  for the purpose  of collecting  money  for advertising
or  promotion,  or to  regulate  quality, shipping  dates,  or containers.
Few  of them have had a significant effect on supply and consequent-
ly  on  prices.  Winter  tomatoes,  celery,  onions, and potatoes  are  the
principal vegetables  covered by federal marketing  orders.
It  is  extremely  difficult  to estimate  the price  effects  of fruit and
vegetable  marketing  orders,  but the total impact on consumer spend-
ing  cannot  be  very  large  simply  because  such  a small part of fruits
and  vegetables  production  is  covered  by  federal  marketing  orders.
Such  orders  now cover  commodities  which  provide  less than 10 per-
cent of the total volume of fresh vegetables consumed  eachyear.  This
is equivalent to about 10 pounds per person per year. At most, prices
have  been  raised  by  an  average  of  5 to  10 cents  per pound of raw
product.  Thus,  eliminating  vegetable  marketing  orders  probably
would save  consumers no more than $1 per person per year.
Sugar Support Policies
At  present,  raw  sugar  prices  in  the  United  States  average  about
six  cents  per  pound  above  import  prices.  The  differential  is  main-
tained  by  collecting  duties  on  imports.  If the  U.S.  were  to  elimi-
nate domestic  subsidies,  it would be necessary to import more sugar.
Consequently,  world  prices  for  sugar  would  rise.  The  floor  price
established  under  the recently  negotiated  international sugar  agree-
ment is  11  cents  per pound,  two to three cents per pound above the
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strictions  and  duties  on  sugar,  consumers  might save as much as four
or  five  cents  per pound  on  the 124  pounds of sweeteners  they  pur-
chase  each  year  for a total  savings  of $5 to $6  per  person  per year.
Holding  Down  the Cost of Imported Food
The  government  has  even less  leverage to influence the cost of im-
ported  foods  such  as  coffee,  tea,  cocoa,  fish,  and  bananas.  These
items  presently  account  for  about  5  percent  of what the consumer
spends  for food.  The government might attempt to hold down prices
of  storable  commodities,  such  as  coffee,  by  accumulating  stocks at
low prices and making them available in short-crop  years, but there is
no  legislative  authority  to do so at present. Furthermore, such a pro-
gram  would  have to be initiated at a time of world surpluses in order
to be successful  as an anti-inflation measure.
The  only  other  way  in  which  the  government  might  seek to in-
fluence  the  cost  of  imported  items  is  to  enter  into  international
price-stabilization  agreements  such as the one recently negotiated for
sugar.  But such  agreements  are  difficult  to negotiate  and  even  more
difficult  to enforce.  Furthermore,  exporting  countries  are interested
mainly in using such agreements  as an instrument to raise commodity
prices,  as the  OPEC  nations  have  done  with  oil,  rather  than to hold
down  prices.  Thus,  such  agreements  are not likely  to be an effective
instrument to curb inflation.
Holding Down Marketing Costs
Since about  two thirds of what the consumer now spends for food
goes  to pay  for processing,  transporting,  packaging,  and distributing
commodities  supplied by farmers, it is essential to find ways in which
marketing  costs  can  be  contained  if  one  is  to  have  a  significant
impact  on  the rate of inflation  in food prices.  Labor represents  the
largest  single item in marketing costs, followed by transportation  and
packaging.  About the only way in which these costs can be restrained
is through  general anti-inflation  policies.
Additional  savings  in  marketing  costs  might  be  achieved  by  en-
couraging more  direct marketing  of foods,  deregulating  the trucking
industry  and  limiting  mergers  or even  breaking  up firms  in markets
where  competition  appears  to  be  weak.  Considerable  publicity has
been  given  to  the  study  conducted  by Mueller  and his students  re-
garding  the  price  effects  of  market  concentration  in  retail  food
distribution.  The sample data to which they had access indicated that
retail  food  prices  averaged  somewhat  higher  in  metropolitan  areas
having  a  high  degree  of  market  concentration  than  in  those  areas
where the four firm concentration ratio was lower.
There  may  have  been  other  confounding  factors  which  contrib-
uted  to the  results  they  obtained;  nevertheless,  this  is  one  area  in
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tude of savings  that might be  achieved  by policies designed to foster
competition.
Conclusions
The  same  kind of political  constraints  that limit the government's
ability to hold down  energy  costs  apply  to food  as well. There are a
number of things which  could  be done to reduce  the prices  of indi-
vidual commodities,  such  as increasing  imports  of beef, reducing im-
port duties  on  sugar,  and doing away with the Class I differential for
milk.  But in total,  the effects  of these  modifications  in current poli-
cies on food costs are likely to be relatively  small.
The principal  factors  which  have contributed  to accelerated infla-
tion in raw product  prices  since  1972  are not subject to government
manipulation  or control.  This includes  damage  to the coffee crop in
Brazil,  the turning  of the  cattle  cycle,  poor  harvests  in  the  Soviet
Union  and  weather-related  reductions  in the supply  of certain fruits
and fresh  vegetables.  There  is relatively  little the government can do
under  present  legislation  to  bring  down  marketing  costs  as long as
general inflation persists.
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